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In February, Greece agreed to a four month extension of its current bailout programme, subject to
the approval of reform measures proposed by the Greek government. As yet, however, the
country’s creditors have still not reached an agreement over the reforms which have been put
forward. Nikitas Konstantinidis writes that with tough negotiations ahead, the piecemeal approach
which has so far been adopted by Eurozone governments during the crisis is becoming increasingly
unsustainable.
The recent negotiations and the agreement to extend the Master Financial Assistance Facility
Agreement between Greece and its institutional creditors (the IMF, ECB and Eurozone) highlight a range of issues
pertaining to European monetary, ﬁscal, and political integration.
This two-level negotiation between a weak debtor country on the verge of default and a heterogeneous coalition of
creditors may well prove to be of utmost political signiﬁcance. The diversity of national positions on the issue of
Greece within the Eurogroup – with France and Italy taking a softer position vis-à-vis Greece as opposed to
Germany, Spain, Portugal, and the Northern bloc – and the multiplicity of overlapping transnational cleavages
aﬀected by its potential redistributional eﬀects demonstrate the issue’s political complexity.
Some observers have likened the recent bailout negotiations to a game of ‘chicken’ with uncertain ‘collision’ payoﬀs.
The original two bailouts in 2010 and 2012 were mostly driven by fears of ﬁnancial contagion in the event of a
‘Grexit’, which were eventually allayed through the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism, the activist
monetary policies of the ECB (especially through the OMT and QE programmes), and the launch of the banking
union.
What was markedly diﬀerent this time round was the fact that, following the sovereign bond restructuring in
February 2012 (with private sector involvement), the bulk of Greek external debt now rests in the hands of the oﬃcial
sector (see Figure 1), which is answerable to foreign electorates, taxpayers, sovereign bondholders, and non-
European IMF member states.
Figure 1: Distribution of Greek debt
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As a result, the political contours of the relationship between Greece and its creditors have been signiﬁcantly altered.
Political contagion has become the new name of the game, both in terms of, ﬁrst, signalling commitment to the
irreversibility of EMU to global investors; second, inducing ﬁscally prudent behaviour by EMU incumbents
(especially those not under an oﬃcial bailout programme) in accordance with the Fiscal Compact (moral hazard);
and third, helping the electoral prospects of mainstream pro-European parties (adverse selection) by signalling
resolve to enforce the existing policy framework.
The nature of the agreement would set a precedent on the renegotiability of Eurozone rules in the aftermath of
national elections and partisan shifts in the make-up of national governments. Whichever way the pendulum swung,
strong signals would be sent to multiple recipients (governments, parties, voters, taxpayers, and investors). The
hard-powered incentives of monetary bailout and the leverage enjoyed by creditors over a heavily indebted nation
have rendered Greece the guinea pig of austerity policies. Continued adherence to such a policy prescription in the
face of limited signs of economic recovery is a warning to others who may wish to tamper with the ﬁscal rules of
EMU (e.g. France and Italy).
In the end, a delicate balance was struck between respect for national democracy and adherence to common rules,
considerations of moral hazard and the humanitarian eﬀects of austerity, containment of political contagion and
apprehension of the domino eﬀects of a potential ‘Grexit’. Although in principle the extension agreement was seen
as a reaﬃrmation of the loan-for-reforms conditionality arrangement reﬂecting the interests of creditor nations and
institutions as well as pro-austerity governments such as Spain and Portugal, the intentionally vague phraseology of
the joint statement constituted a signiﬁcant concession to the new Syriza government, not least because of its
omission of the politically toxic terms of ‘Troika’ and ‘Memorandum’.
Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis used the phrase ‘creative ambiguity’ to characterise the spirit of the
renegotiated contractual arrangement. On the one hand, the wording provides a strong enough recapitulation of the
terms of the relationship between Greece and its creditors so as to be acceptable to both national parliaments and
public opinion.
Moreover, with Greece’s commitment to abstain from any unilateral actions with signiﬁcant budgetary costs, creditor
institutions (formerly known as the ‘Troika’) have reasserted themselves as eﬀective veto players or ‘censors’ in the
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domestic policy formation process. On the other hand, the Greek government won some time, discretion, and
ﬂexibility in its design and implementation of a socially fair and ﬁscally balanced adjustment to economic growth and
sustainability (outlined in the gradually unveiled ‘Varoufakis’ list of reforms).
Greece is thus becoming the ‘co-author’ of its own reform strategy. The key question remains how well it can ‘sell’ it
to both domestic and international audiences. In its pursuit of this new package of reforms, the new Greek
government – while still enjoying a high level of political capital and a strong anti-austerity mandate – will have to
walk the tight rope of gaining international credibility in the eyes of foreign creditors and investors without losing
popular and partisan support.
And yet, the loan extension agreement in February constituted only one salvo in the battle against the Greek debt
crisis. It eﬀectively set the stage for an upcoming round of negotiations between Greece and its creditors with
respect to debt restructuring and potentially a new bailout. Continued economic and political uncertainty, anaemic
growth, and deﬂationary pressures in Greece may render its euro membership increasingly untenable in the near
future. Despite eﬀorts to ‘quarantine’ the Greek ‘patient’ and to present it as an exceptional case, the ongoing
strategy of ‘muddling through’ the rough waters of a debt crisis may soon have to give way to a watershed decision
tipping the scales towards less austerity and more ﬁscal centralisation.
In the face of deteriorating economic prospects for Greece and urgent liquidity needs, any decision aiming at
keeping the Eurozone intact will have to be more radical than what has been seen so far. It has been a recurring
theme of international monetary regimes that, when there is conﬂict between internal adjustment and external
adjustment objectives and no recourse to ﬁscal or monetary stabilisers, such a regime comes under intense
pressure to either disintegrate or transform itself into a ﬁscal union.
Thus, the political spill-over eﬀects of a new deal with Greece will be unavoidable, either in terms of paving the way
for more ﬁscal coordination and centralisation under a more ﬂexible regime, or marking the beginning of the end of
EMU. In other words, these current squabbles may either amount to the ‘growing pains’ or the ‘dying throes’ of an
‘ever closer union’. What is for sure is that the incrementalist approach adopted so far is becoming increasingly
unsustainable.
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